We present a mechanism for double auction of multiple items. We consider three different settings. (1) There is one item-type. Each seller holds several units of that item and each buyer may want several units of that item. Buyers and sellers have constant or decreasing marginal returns. (2) There are multiple item-types. Each seller holds several units of a pre-specified type and the buyers are unit-demand. (3) There are multiple item-types. Each seller holds several units of a pre-specified type and the buyers have gross-substitute valuations. The mechanism is a combination of random-sampling and random-serial-dictatorship. It is prior-free, universally individuallyrational, dominant-strategy truthful and strongly budget-balanced. Its market-gain-from-trade approaches the optimum when the market in all item types is sufficiently large.
INTRODUCTION
In the simplest double auction a single seller has a single item. The seller values the item for s, which is private information to the seller. A single buyer values the item for b, which is private to the buyer. If b > s, then trade can increase the utility for both traders; there is a potential gain-from-trade of b − s. However, there is no truthful, individually rational, budget-balanced mechanism that will perform the trade if-and-only-if it is beneficial to both traders. The reason is that it is impossible to determine a price truthfully. This is easy to see for a deterministic mechanism. If the mechanism chooses a price p < b, the seller is incentivized to bid (p + b)/2 to force the price up; similarly, if the mechanism chooses a price p > s, the buyer is incentivized to force the price down. The impossibility holds even when the valuations are drawn from a known prior distribution and even when the mechanism is allowed to randomize; see the classic papers of Vickrey [1961] and Myerson and Satterthwaite [1983] .
In his seminal work, McAfee [1992] showed how to surpass this impossibility result when there are many sellers, each with a private valuation s i , and many buyers, each with private valuation b i . In McAfee's double auction mechanism (slightly simplified for the sake of brevity), each participant is asked to give his valuation. The sellers are sorted in an ascending order according to their valuations s 1 ≤ s 2 ≤ . . . ≤ s n , and the buyers are sorted in a descending order b 1 ≥ b 2 ≥ . . . ≥ b n . Let k be the maximal value such that s k ≤ b k . Assuming everyone were truthful, the optimal solution would have been to pick any price s k ≤ p ≤ b k , and perform k deals in that price. Instead, McAfee uses two prices, and does k − 1 deals: all sellers with values s 1 , . . . , s k−1 sell their items for s k , and the buyers with values b 1 , . . . b k−1 buy an item for b k . Since there are two prices, money is left on the table, but at least the mechanism does not need to subsidize the market. Also, This research is funded in part by the ISF grant 1083/13, the Doctoral Fellowships of Excellence Program and the Mordecai and Monique Katz Graduate Fellowship Program at Bar-Ilan University. Authors' address: Computer Science Department, Bar-Ilan University, Ramat-Gan 5290002, Israel. emails: erelsgl@gmail.com.
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-k x : the total number of units of item x exchanging hands in the optimal situation (regardless of incentives). We call this number the market size of item x. When there are multiple item-types, our analysis depends on the relation between k min := min x k x and k max := max x k x . -m: the maximum number of items offered by a single seller or wanted by a single buyer.
Naturally, when m is larger the convergence of the mechanism to the optimal gain is slower. We assume that m is constant independent of the market size.
We study three different settings, which differ in the valuations of the buyers.
In the first setting, there is only one item-type. The buyers have diminishing marginal returns and each buyer wants at most m units of that item.
THEOREM 1 (SECTION 4). When both sellers and buyers are single-type multi-unit with diminishing-marginal-returns and √ k x / ln k x ≥ 160m, the competitive ratio of RSDA is 1 −
In the second setting, there are m different types of items. The buyers are unit-demand -each buyer wants one item which may be of different types. The competitive ratio depends on the the number of deals in each item-type. In particular, it is required that k max is sufficiently large relative to m, and k min is sufficiently large relative to k max .
THEOREM 2 (SECTION 5). When sellers are single-type multi-unit with diminishingmarginal-returns and buyers are multi-type unit-demand, and
(ln k max ) 5/2 ≥ 640m 2 and k min ≥ 50m 2 √ k max ln k max , the competitive ratio of RSDA is at least 1 − 26m 2 · √ k max ln k max k min .
The requirement that k min and k max be of a similar order-of-magnitude may seem counterintuitive. Therefore we provide an alternative requirement that is more common in the random-sampling literature (see references in Subsection 1.4.2). It involves a parameter h, which represents the maximum gain from a single agent:
THEOREM 2a (SUBSECTION 5.6) . When sellers are single-type multi-unit with diminishingmarginal-returns and buyers are multi-type unit-demand, and √ k max (ln k max ) 5/2 ≥ 640m 2 , and the gain from each single agent is bounded between 1 and h, the competitive ratio of RSDA is at least 1 −
To complement these two theorems, in Appendix A.4 we present an example showing that when k min < √ k max ln k max and h is unbounded, the gain-from-trade of RSDA might not approach 1 even when m = 2 and both k min and k max go to ∞.
In the third and most general setting studied here, each buyer may want a bundle consisting of several different item-types, with at most one unit per type. The buyers have gross-substitute valuations (see formal definition in Sub. 2.2). The increased generality naturally comes with weaker guarantees.
THEOREM 3 (SECTION 6). When sellers are single-type multi-unit with diminishingmarginal-returns and buyers are multi-type with gross-substitute valuations, and √ k max (ln k max ) 5/2 ≥ 40 · 2 4m /m and k min ≥ 50m 3 · √ k max ln k max , the competitive ratio of RSDA is at least
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This theorem, too, has a variant involving the maximum gain per agent:
THEOREM 3a. When sellers are single-type multi-unit with diminishing-marginal-returns and buyers are multi-type with gross-substitute valuations, and √ k max (ln k max ) 5/2 ≥ 40 · 2 4m /m, and the gain from each single agent is bounded between 1 and h, the competitive ratio of RSDA is at least 1 − 50m 4 · h · ln k max k max .
Overview of analysis
The first challenge in a double-auction mechanism is to agree on a price that is good both for buyers and for sellers. We solve this challenge using random-sampling. But this creates a second challenge: how do we balance out supply and demand in one market, given the equilibrium prices from the other market? In traditional applications of market halving to auctions the seller was the designer, and could afford not to sell a small number of items, but here we need to achieve perfect balance. We solve this second challenge using randomserial-dictatorship. The third challenge, to which most of the paper is devoted, is to analyze the gain-fromtrade. Throughout the paper, we analyze the gain-from-trade in market M B when the price is set to p A ; the opposite direction (the gain-from-trade in M A when the price is set to p B ) is completely analogous.
The first idea that comes to mind is that we should somehow bound the difference between the optimal price p O and the calculated price p A . But this idea is futile, because the numeric value of the price is irrelevant. As an example, suppose we somehow manage to prove that, with high probability, 0.98p O ≤ p A ≤ 0.99p O . For a revenue-maximizing digital-goods auctioneer this is a fantastic bound, because it implies that the auctioneer can extract at least 98 percent of the optimum revenue. However, in a double auction this might be a disaster: if all sellers' valuations are in the range (0.99p O , p O ), all gain-fromtrade is lost.
Our way to cope with this difficulty is to ignore the numeric value of the price altogether, and work directly with trader-sets -sets of buyers and sellers. The two main tools we use to reason about trader-sets are market-clearing equations and halving lemmas.
We illustrate these ideas for a simplified setting of a single-type item (which we call x) and single-unit traders. We conceptually divide the sellers/buyers in the global population to sets, based on whether or not they want to sell/buy x in p O and in p A . Additionally, we divide each trader-set to its two subsets -the traders sampled to M A and those sampled to M B . The relations between the subsets are given by two market-clearing equations:
(1) The market-clearing equation in the global population is: "(Number of buyers who want x in p O in the global population) = (Number of sellers who offer x in p O in the global population)". These market-clearing equations are true with probability 1, by definition of Walrasian equilibrium.
To facilitate the arguments on trader-sets, we develop some notation:
-B denotes buyer-sets and S denotes seller-sets; -The first subscript denotes the preference of the buyers/sellers in price p O ; -The second subscript denotes the preference of the buyers/sellers in price p A ; -The superscript, if exists, denotes the sub-market that this subset belongs to.
Fig. 1:
Trader sets in a single-type single-unit market. Balls represent buyers and squares represent sellers; the height of a ball/square corresponds to the valuation of the agent. Prices are represented by horizontal lines. p O is an optimal price; in that price there are k = 5 deals. p A is a possible equilibrium price determined in market M A ; it can result, for example, from sampling to M A the top three buyers and three of the bottom sellers. Since p A > p O , the trader sets B ∅x and S x∅ are empty but the trader sets B x∅ and S ∅x are not empty. These latter sets are responsible to the loss in gain-from-trade: B x∅ are efficient buyers abandoning the market, and S ∅x are non-efficient sellers entering the market and competing with the efficient ones.
So for example B xx is the set of buyers who want x both in p O and in p A , in the global population; B A xx is the subset of these buyers who are in M A ; S x∅ is the set of sellers who offer x in p O but not in p A (e.g, because p A < p O ); etc. See Figure 1 for illustration.
Using this notation, the market-clearing equations become:
∅x | In order to solve this system of equations, we must somehow relate the sampled sets to their parent sets. We would like to say something like "With high probability, |B A xx | ≈ |B xx |/2 and |S A xx | ≈ |S xx |/2". Inserting such approximations into the market-clearing equations would allow us to argue that S x∅ , S ∅x , B x∅ , B ∅x are small and hence the expected loss in gain-from-trade is small. But here we must carefully distinguish between deterministic sets and random sets. By "deterministic set" we mean a set that is determined by the traders' valuations in the global population, before the random-sampling process. The sets B xx ∪ B x∅ and S xx ∪ S x∅ are deterministic: they are the sets of all buyers/sellers who want/offer x in p O . The traders' valuations in the global population are deterministic (we do not assume that they are drawn from any probability distribution). Hence, p O is deterministic and so are the sets that depend on it. In contrast, the sets B xx and S xx are random, since they depend on p A , which in turn depends on the random-sampling process. For deterministic sets, well-known concentration inequalities imply that w.h.p. their sampled subsets are near their expected value. However, for random sets, such inequalities cannot be used. To illustrate, consider a dummy set S dummy defined as: "the set of all sellers who were not sampled to M A ". Then, by definition |S A dummy | = 0 so it is definitely not true that |S A dummy | ≈ |S dummy |/2. To solve this issue, we develop a mini-theory on the dimension of a random-set. This minitheory is presented formally in Appendix B. In general, the dimension of a random-set is determined by the largest number of sets of a given size in the support of the random-set. For example, we prove that the set S xx is 1-dimensional, since for every j, there is at most a single possible outcome of S xx with a size of j: the set of j sellers with lowest ask-price. We prove several concentration inequalities for random sets of bounded dimension (we call these inequalities "halving lemmas"). With these lemmas, we can return to the analysis of RSDA.
The single-type case is easy to handle, since all trader-sets are one-dimensional (we handle the multi-unit issue by dividing each trader to several virtual-traders; see Subsection 3.1).
When there are multiple types of items, we are facing a new challenge. The interplay between the demands for different item-types may cause a chain reaction. As an example, suppose that the random-sampling process sends more x-sellers to M A than to M B . Since the x-supply in M A is larger, the price of x in the vector p A is lower. As a result, some buyers, who were "supposed" to buy item y (in the optimal situation), now decide to buy x. This could hurt the gain-from-trade coming from item x, especially if the buyers who came from y do not gain much from buying x (even though it's better than buying y for them). Moreover, since the y-demand in M A is smaller, the price of y in the vector p A becomes lower. This can go on and affect other item-types.
A second challenge we are facing is how to bound the dimension of the random sets related to the buyers (the seller sets are still one-dimensional since sellers are single-type). We develop in Appendix B several lemmas by which the dimension of a random set can be calculated. For example, given two random sets B 1 and B 2 with dimensions d 1 , d 2 , the random set B 1 ∪ B 2 has dimension d 1 + d 2 . For intersections of random sets the situation is more complicated: their dimension is bounded only if one of the intersected sets is itself bounded with high probability.
Given our tools to combine low dimensional set random variables into higher dimension ones, we can bound (w.h.p) the size of the sets of buyers who choose to move from one item to another. We analyze the movements by sorting the items according to their price increase (which may be negative), starting with the item with the largest increase (no new buyers start to want this item). We conclude that the total change in demand is bounded with high probability.
Finally, buyers who can buy multiple units raise a couple of new challenges. First, it is difficult to describe using a set random variable the buyers who stop buying an item x. We argue that these buyers are exactly buyers who bought x in the original market (a deterministic set), intersect the set of buyers for which there exists a bundle without x which is better than any bundle with x. This is an intersection of 2 m one-dimensional set random variables, which gives the exponential dependence in m in the assumptions of Theorem 3.
Second, it is not a-priori clear if ordering the items according to their price increase still makes sense. For example, is it possible that a buyer will want to buy the item whose price increased the most, even though the buyer didn't want it at the original price? We devote Appendix C to proving that, as long as all buyers have gross-substitute valuations, the item-ordering is still meaningful.
Overcoming the challenges causes us to require that k max = Ω(2 8m ). We do not know if this exponential factor is real or merely an artifact of our imperfect analysis.
Overview of negative results
In Appendix A we present some negative examples that illustrate the inherent difficulties in the multi-type situation. For us, the main goal of the paper is proving 1 − o(1) approximation results for a "large" market (large here means many optimal deals). When there is a large market, but the approximation ratio is bounded away from 1, we view this as a negative result.
(1) The primary difficulty in a double auction is to determine the prices truthfully. What if the prices are given exogenously, and all we want is to optimize the gain-from-trade given the prices? This is easy to achieve with a single item-type. We show that, even with two item-types, this becomes impossible. We present a setting with two item-types, unit demand buyers and additive sellers (endowed with one unit of each good), and show that no truthful randomized mechanism can guarantee an approximation ratio better than 1/2 for the gain from trade.
(2) We have proved that RSDA works well when k min = Ω(m 2 √ k max ln k max ). We analyze whether this requirement is necessary. To do this, we consider a market such that the optimal trades are 2k buyers buying x, and 2k 2 buyers buying y. We consider the case where all the gain from trade comes from two buyers who buy x, and assume that they are both in M B . We show that there is a constant probability for an oversupply of k in M A , which can tempt all the x buyers in market A to buy Y, thus reducing the price of x. Now the price of commodity x in M B will be so low, that there will be no supply of it, and the two "important" x buyers in M B will not be able to buy. As all this happens with constant probability (regardless of k), this rules out the possibility of proving 1 − o(1) approximation results.
Related Work
Our work combines two lines of research: double auctions and random-sampling mechanisms. We survey the literature in each of these lines and show the differences between them.
1.4.1. Double auction mechanisms. The Vickrey-Clarke-Grove (VCG) mechanism is a wellknown mechanism that can be used in various settings, including double auction. It is IC and attains the maximum total-gain-from-trade. Its main drawback is that it has budget deficit, which means that the auctioneer has to bring money from home.
In a series of papers, Babaioff and his colleagues provide several variants of McAfee's Trade-Reduction mechanism that handle spatially-distributed markets with transit costs [Babaioff et al. 2004] and supply chains [Babaioff and Nisan 2004; Babaioff and Walsh 2006, 2005] , providing similar welfare guarantees. One variant, Probabilistic Reduction [Babaioff and Nisan 2004] , achieves ex-ante budget balance by randomly selecting between the Vickrey-Clarke-Grove (VCG) mechanism and the Trade-Reduction mechanism. The probability is selected such that the deficit of the VCG exactly balances (in expectation) the Add = additive, DMR = decreasing-marginal-returns, UD = unit-demand, GS = Gross-substitute, Sub = subadditive, Any = arbitrary valuations. See Section 2 for definitions. -PF (prior-free)-Whether the mechanism works without any assumptions on the distribution of valuations.
-Budget -Whether the budget is balanced (* means "in expectation" -based on assumed prior).
-TGFT, MGFT -The guaranteed total-gain-from-trade and market-gain-from-trade relative to the optimum (they are different only when the budget is not strongly-balanced; see Appendix A.2). Higher is better: 1 means optimal, 0 means that all welfare might be lost. * means "in expectation". k is the number of efficient deals. k min is the minimum number of efficient deals in a single type. m is the maximum number of units per agent. 
Mechanism
surplus of McAfee. However, the probability depends on the distribution of the agents' valuations so the mechanism is not prior-free. Lately, there has been a surge of interest in a more complicated market, namely double spectrum auctions, in which an auction is used to transfer spectrum from incumbent companies (e.g. TV stations) to modern companies (e.g. cellular operators). Zhou and Zheng [2009] and Yao et al. [2011] adapted the Trade-Reduction mechanism to a double-spectrumauction by creating groups of non-interfering buyers that can buy the same channel. Wang et al. [2010] created on online variant of Trade-Reduction to handle the case in which new buyers arrive over time. Wang et al. [2011] adapted Trade-Reduction to enable local markets, in which only some buyer-seller combinations are feasible. Feng et al. [2012] adapted it to enable heterogeneous spectra. All these advancements are still for a single-type singleunit auction. Two remarkable exceptions are the TAHES mechanism of Feng et al. [2012] , which is multi-type single-unit, and the Secondary Market mechanism of Xu et al. [2010] , which is single-type multi-unit. It assumes that the valuation of each trader is additive, i.e, the utility of an agent increases linearly with the quantity it holds.
Our RSDA mechanism takes a step towards handling richer settings. However, it is still not sufficiently rich to handle the full complexity of spectrum auctions with constraints related to interference, complementaries, geographical limitations, etc.
Blumrosen and Dobzinski [2014] presented a Combinatorial Reallocation mechanism. It can handle very general settings, including agents that are both buyers and sellers and have arbitrary sub-additive valuations. The competitive ratio is 1/[8 · Θ(log m)] where m is the maximum number of items per single seller; it does not approach 1 as the market grows. Additionally, their mechanism is not prior free since it needs to know the median value of the initial endowment of each seller. There is no budget deficit but there may be a budget surplus.
Recently, Colini-Baldeschi et al. [2016] presented a two-sided sequential posted price mechanism (2SPM). It handles single-type single-unit traders and can handle matroid constraints on the sets of buyers that can be served simultaneously. It is strongly budgetbalanced and achieves a multiplicative approximation of between 4 to 16, depending on the setting.
Most double auction papers aim to maximize the increase in social welfare; an exception is Deshmukh et al. [2002] , where the goal is to maximize the auctioneer profit. Table I summarizes the double-auction mechanisms we know of and compares them to our results.
1.4.2. Random sampling mechanisms. Random sampling is a common technique for priorfree mechanism design. It was introduced for maximizing revenue in auctions of digital goods [Goldberg et al. 2001] . Since digital goods are available in unlimited supply, it is always possible to apply the price calculated in one half of the market to the other half. While the mechanism itself is simple, its performance analysis is quite complicated. Initially its competitive ratio was bounded at 7600, later it was improved to 15 [Feige et al. 2005] and recently to 4.76 [Alaei et al. 2009 ]. These papers focus on multiplicative competitive ratios which are valid regardless of the market size. Other papers [Balcan et al. 2008 ] focus on "large" markets, in which the competitive ratio should approach 1.
One difference between the double-auction literature and the random-samplingmechanism literature is in the definition of a "large" market. In the random-sampling literature, it is common to measure the market size by the number of potential traders, usually denoted by n [Balcan et al. 2008] . Moreover, it is common to assume that the total revenue from a single buyer is bounded by some constant h, or that buyers are sampled from some unknown bounded-support distribution [Baliga and Vohra 2003] . Additionally, the assumption on h implies that in a large market, k (the number of efficient deals) is also large. In contrast, in the double-auction literature since McAfee [1992] , the market size is measured only by the number of actual traders in the optimal situation, a number usually denoted by k. It is possible that k n, e.g, when there are many "potential" buyers/sellers with low/high valuations, that do not trade even in the optimal situation
Since the present paper is on double auctions, we adopt McAfee's measurement. We do not make any assumption on the total number of traders (n) or the valuation of a single trader (h) and aim for an approximation that becomes better when the number of deals in the optimal situation (k) grows.
Another issue with random-sampling mechanisms is the selection of benchmark for measuring the mechanism performance. The optimal revenue cannot be approximated in any constant ratio. Even the optimal single-price revenue cannot be approximated. Therefore the common benchmark is the optimal single-price revenue in which at least two units are sold [Goldberg et al. 2006 ]. An alternative benchmark is the optimal envy-free revenue [Devanur et al. 2015] . In contrast, in the double-auction literature, a single benchmark is used: it is the optimal gain-from-trade, defined as the maximum possible improvement in social welfare -the improvement when the most economically-efficient deals are carried out. This benchmark does not assume anything on the price-system. We adopt this benchmark throughout the present paper.
Beyond the single-parametric digital-goods environment, Random-sampling auctions were applied in multi-parametric (combinatorial) digital-goods environment [Balcan et al. 2008] , and in single-parametric physical-goods environment with various kinds of constraints [Devanur et al. 2015] . We are aware of a single random-sampling mechanism for double auctions [Baliga and Vohra 2003] ; it assumes an unknown bounded-support distribution and handles only single-type single-unit traders.
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PRELIMINARIES AND NOTATION
There are agents of two types: sellers and buyers. Each seller is willing to sell at most m items and each buyer is interested in buying at most m items. No assumptions are made on the number of agents.
Walrasian equilibrium
A Walrasian equilibrium (aka competitive equilibrium) consists of a price-vector in which the demand and supply are balanced. I.e, for each buyer there exists a "demanded bundle" (a bundle that is optimal to buy given the price-vector) and for each seller there exists a "supplied bundle" (a bundle that is optimal to sell given the price-vector) such that the union of demanded-bundles equals the union of supplied-bundles. This situation is also called market-clearing. When a Walrasian equilibrium exists, it attains the maximum gainfrom-trade (Theorem 11.13 in [Nisan 2007]) .
The RSDA mechanism calculates a Walrasian equilibrium in the Price Calculation step. Note that often there are many different Walrasian equilibria. In this case, the RSDA may arbitrarily choose one of these equilibria; our results do not depend on which equilibrium is chosen.
Valuations
Each agent has a valuation function on bundles of items. The valuation of buyer i is denoted b i and that of seller i is denoted s i . The agents maximize their quasi-linear utility function. If buyer i buys a bundle X i , its utility is b i (X i ) − p(X i ) (valuation minus price). If a seller i sells X i and remains with an unsold bundle X i , its utility is p(X i ) + s i (X i ).
Our mechanisms are developed for sellers that are single-type, so that each seller is interested only in the number of units they hold. We also assume that the sellers have decreasing marginal returns (DMR). This means that the utility from holding an additional unit weakly decreases when the total number of units held by the seller increases. Formally, if s i (j) is the utility of seller i from holding j units, then DMR means that ∀j ∈ {0, . . . , m − 2} :
. This also implies that the net gain from selling an additional unit weakly decreases when the total number of units sold increases.
Regarding the buyers, we consider three classes of valuations. 1. Single-type buyers who, like the sellers, have decreasing marginal returns (DMR). When both buyers and sellers are single-type, the auction can be conducted in each type separately and thus it is sufficient to consider a single-type auction.
2. Multi-type unit-demand buyers. These buyers are interested in a single unit of one of several item-types, with possibly different valuations to different types. A unit-demand buyer i is characterized by m numbers b i,1 , . . . , b i,m , such that for each bundle X: b i (x) = max x∈X b i,x . I.e, a buyer receiving a bundle with two or more items uses the best unit from this bundle and discards the rest.
3. Gross-substitute (GS) buyers. A buyer is said to be GS if the following is true for every two price-vectors p, q and for every item x (where ∆ x := q x − p x ): If ∀y : ∆ y ≥ 0 and ∆ x = 0 and the buyer wants x in price p, then the buyer wants x in price q (if all items become weakly more expensive while item x retains its price, then the agent does not cease wanting item x).
The following facts about GS valuations [Gul and Stacchetti 1999] are relevant for us: (a) Single-type DMR valuations are a subset of GS valuations.
(b) Multi-type unit-demand valuations are another subset of GS valuations.
(c) When all agents have GS valuations, a Walrasian equilibrium always exists and can be found efficiently, e.g, using an English auction [Gul and Stacchetti 2000] .
These facts imply that, in all scenarios studied in this paper, the Price Calculation step of the RSDA mechanism can be done efficiently.
A:12
Notation
The following notation is used throughout the paper: -The letters x, y, z denote item-types. The letters X, Y, P, Q denote item-bundles. -B (with super/subscripts) denotes a subset of buyers, S denotes a subset of sellers. -A superscript A or B denotes a subset of traders sampled into half-market M A /M B , respectively. -p denotes a price-vector. p O is the optimal price-vector (equilibrium price in global population) and p A is the equilibrium price in M A (also p B is the equilibrium price in M B , but we focus on p A ). -The shorthand "w.p. x" means "with probability of at least x".
When the name of a subset appears in a numeric context, it denotes the cardinality of that subset. I.e, we often write B instead of |B|, S 1 + S 2 instead of |S 1 ∪ S 2 | (when S 1 , S 2 are known to be disjoint), etc.
GENERAL PROPERTIES
This section contains general definitions and lemmas that are relevant to all classes of buyers' valuations studied in this paper.
Virtual Agents
A natural way to handle multi-unit agents is to replace each real agent (RA) with unitdemand virtual agents (VA). For example, if agent i has utility of 7 for a single unit and 9 for two units, we replace the real agent i with two single-unit virtual agents, one with utility 7 and one with utility 2 (A similar technique has been used by [Chawla et al. 2010 ] in a different context). The decreasing-marginal-returns property guarantees that the VAs are ordered in decreasing order of utility. If all valuations are known, the number of efficient deals (k) can be calculated based on VAs, i.e. it is the number of pairs of VAs that trade in an efficient allocation (equivalently, the number of items exchanging hands in Walrasian equilibrium). When using VAs, one should keep in mind that all VAs of a single RA are sampled together to the same market. I.e, each RA represents up to m different VAs that go together either to sub-market M A or to M B . This adds a factor m to the approximation ratio, as can be seen in the Random-Halving Lemmas in Appendix B.
Price Changes
Due to the random-sampling process, there is a difference between the equilibrium price in M A and the (hypothetic) equilibrium price in the global market. Denote the price difference for item x by ∆ x = p A x − p O x . Note that p A x is a random variable determined by the sampling process, while p O x is a deterministic price determined by the valuations of the buyers and sellers in the global population.
Definition 3.1. Given a utility function u and a price-vector p, define the net-utility function u p as: u p (X) := u(X) − p(X) for every bundle X. Definition 3.2. Given a utility function u and a price-vector p, we say that a bundle P is a p-demand if it is optimal for the agent to have this bundle when the prices are p, i.e, the set P maximizes the net-utility function u p (·) over all bundles of items: ∀X : u p (P) ≥ u p (X).
Definition 3.3. Given a utility function u and a price-vector p, we say that an item x is p-demanded if there exists a p-demand P such that P x.
Definition 3.4. Given a buyer, an item x and a pair of price-vectors (p O , p A ), we say that:
Trader Sets
We consider three disjoint sets of virtual-sellers in the global population. In general, these are random-sets since they depend on p A
x . -S xx -the virtual-sellers who offer x both in price p O and in price p A . -S x∅ -the virtual-sellers who offer x in price p O but stop offering it in price p A . -S ∅x -the virtual-sellers who do not offer x in price p O but offer it in price p A .
Note that S x∅ is nonempty only if ∆ x < 0 (item x became cheaper) and S ∅x is nonempty only if ∆ x > 0 (item x became more expensive). Hence, at least one of these sets must be empty (see Figure 1) .
We consider the following buyer-sets (which may represent virtual-buyers if the buyers are multi-unit):
-B xx -buyers for whom x is both p O -demanded and p A -demanded.
The notation for buyers is different than the notation for sellers to emphasize that, in general, buyers may be multi-type. This means that a buyer may switch from buying item x, not only to buying the empty set ∅, but also to buying another item. See Figure 2 for illustration.
Market-clearing
For every real item x, the following market-clearing equations are true w.p. 1:
For every item x, the set B xx ∪ B x− is the set of buyers who buy x at price p O ; it is a deterministic set that contains exactly k x buyers. Similarly, the set S xx ∪ S x∅ is is a deterministic set that contains exactly k x sellers. Hence, by the Deterministic-set Halving Lemma (B.1), for every item x, w.p. 1 − 2/k 2 x :
Combining these two inequalities gives, for every item x, w.
For every real item x, define the following sets:
The former represents the excess supply in x due to price increase: the coming sellers and the lost buyers. The latter represents the excess demand in x due to price decrease: the Prices are represented by points (p x , p y ). The point p O is an optimal price-vector and the point p A is a price-vector calculated at market M A . Here, the order of price-changes is ∆ y < ∆ x < 0. Since item y is in the bottom of the ordering, no buyer abandoned item y so B y− is empty. B x− is not empty, but it is contained in B +y .
lost sellers and the coming buyers. Inequality (3.5) implies that their difference in M A , 
ONE ITEM-TYPE, MULTI-UNIT BUYERS
In this section, there is a single item-type that we denote by x. The buyers are, like the sellers, multi-unit with decreasing-marginal-returns. Each buyer wants at most m units of x. Therefore, the set B x− (the buyers who abandon item x) is equal to the set B x∅ (the virtual-buyers who want x in price p O and want nothing in price p A ). Similarly, the set B +x (the buyers who discover item x) is equal to the set B ∅x . Note that B ∅x is nonempty only if ∆ x < 0 (item x became cheaper) and B x∅ is nonempty only if ∆ x > 0 (item x became more expensive).
Our analysis assumes that k x (the number of efficient deals) is sufficiently large. Specifically, we assume that:
(Assumption 4-a)
From the market A to the global population
We analyze the performance of the RSDA mechanism assuming that ∆ x ≤ 0. The analysis of the case ∆ x ≥ 0 is its mirror-image. When ∆ x ≤ 0 (the item became cheaper), B x∅ = S ∅x = ∅, so D x− = 0 and inequality (3.5) reduces to:
In words: the excess demand in item x in market M A , caused by the sampling process, is at most 2m √ k x ln k x . We have to convert this inequality to an inequality on D +x in the global population. To do this, we use the Random-set Halving Corollary.
We claim that the set B ∅x is a 1-dimensional random-set. It is determined by the inequalities:
The first inequality is deterministic; only the second one is random. A set determined by a single random inequality is one-dimensional (Lemma B.11). Similarly, the set S x∅ is 1-dimensional. Hence, the set D +x = B ∅x ∪ S x∅ is two-dimensional (Lemma B.15).
We substitute d = 2 and z min = 5m √ k x ln k x in (B.11). By (4.1), D A +x < 0.4z min . Assumption 4-a, namely √ k x / ln k x ≥ 160m, implies that the condition to applying that lemma, namely 0.1z min ≥ dm √ z min ln z min , is satisfied. Hence:
If p A were applied to the global population, we would have an excess demand of D +x (the buyers who start demanding x and the sellers who stop offering x due to the pricedecrease).
From the global population to market B
In M B , the loss of gain-from-trade comes from two sources, both caused by the fact that p A is too low relative to the optimal price: -Some efficient sellers do not want to sell; -Some inefficient buyers want to buy, and compete with the efficient buyers in the Buyers Lottery.
The first loss is at most S x∅ and these are the least efficient sellers from the set of k x efficient sellers. Hence, the relative loss in gain-from-trade of the sellers is at most:
For the second loss, we have to calculate the probability that a buyer loses a deal in the Buyers Lottery. This probability equals the excess demand divided by the total demand.
. It is at least B B xx , which is equal to B xx − B A xx . Since x became cheaper, B x− = ∅, so B xx = k x .
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Hence, the loss probability is bounded by:
. Hence, the expected relative loss in gain-from-trade of the buyers is at most:
So the expected relative loss of all traders is bounded by 11m
. To this we should add the failure probability of the above inequalities (3.5 and 4.2); this probability is negligible relative to m
. Therefore, the competitive ratio of RSDA is at least 1 − 12m
MULTI-TYPE UNIT-DEMAND BUYERS
In this section there are m different item-types. Each buyer is unit-demand and wants a single unit of one of the m item-types. Each seller is single-type and offers at most m units of its type. We need the following assumptions on k x , k max and m:
The Item-Ordering property
Some of our results depend on the assumption that the buyers' valuations satisfy a certain property, which we call Item Ordering (IO). Consider the two price vectors p O and p A . For every item x, let ∆ x = p A x − p O x = the increase in the price of item x between the Walrasian equilibrium in the global population and the Walrasian equilibrium in half-market M A . Intuitively, the IO property means that a buyer switches from wanting item x in price p O to wanting item y in price p A , only if ∆ x > ∆ y . This means that the items can be ordered in increasing order of ∆ x so that buyers switch only downwards (from higher to lower index).
We also define a null item, ∅. "Buying" the null item means buying nothing. By setting ∆ ∅ = 0, the property described above is true for the null item, too, i.e: a buyer switches from wanting x in p O to wanting nothing in p A only if ∆ x > 0 and switches in the opposite direction only if ∆ x < 0. We insert the null item into the item-ordering, saying that an item is "above null" (x > ∅) if its price increased and "below null" (x < ∅) if its price decreased. We now present the Item Ordering property formally. 
(a) If ∆ x ≤ 0 and the agent abandoned x, then the agent discovered some item y such that ∆ y < ∆ x .
(b) If ∆ x ≥ 0 and the agent discovered x, then the agent abandoned some item y such that ∆ y > ∆ x .
The IO property is obviously satisfied when the buyers have unit-demand valuations. In Appendix C we prove that it is satisfied for all gross-substitute valuations.
Dimensions of Traders Sets
We first calculate the dimension of each of the trader-sets. The seller-sets S xx , S x∅ , S ∅x are easy: since the sellers are still single-type, the seller-sets are still one-dimensional. In contrast, the buyer-sets B xx , B x− , B +x are no longer one-dimensional. To bound their dimension, we define some auxiliary sets.
-For every item x including the null item, let B x * = the set of buyers who want x in p O
(regardless of what they want in p A ). Since p O is a deterministic price-vector, B x * is a deterministic set. -For every two different items y and z, including null, let B z≺y = the set of buyers for whom
In other words, these are the buyers who prefer y to z when the price vector is p A . Each of these sets is one-dimensional since it is determined by a single random inequality.
We use these auxiliary sets to calculate the dimension of the buyer sets B xx , B x− , B +x .
LEMMA 5.2. For every item x including null, B x− is an m-dimensional random-set.
PROOF. The set B x− contains the buyers who want x in p O but do not want x in p A . A unit-demand buyer does not buy x in p A , if-and-only-if there is another item (possibly the null item) that the buyer prefers over x. Hence: B x− = B x * ∩ z =x B x≺z . The union has m 1-dimensional sets, so by Cor. B.16 it is m-dimensional. The set B x * is deterministic, so by Cor. B.14, the intersection is m-dimensional.
LEMMA 5.3. For every real item x, B xx is an (m · ln k max )-dimensional random-set.
PROOF. The set B xx contains the buyers who want x in p O and want x in p A . A unitdemand buyer wants x in p A , if-and-only-if he prefers x over all other items, including null. Hence: B xx = B x * ∩ z =x B z≺x . Whenever x is a real item, the size of B x * is the (deterministic) number that we denoted by k x . Moreover, the intersection at the right has at most m one-dimensional terms (including a term for the null item). Apply Lemma B.18
Bounding the dimension of B +x is more complicated. Define B x * = the set of buyers who do not want x in price p O (the complement of B x * ). Then: B +x = B x * ∩ z =x B z≺x . In contrast to Lemma 5.3, we have no bound on the size of the deterministic set B x * . As explained in the introduction, we do not assume that the total number of potential buyers is bounded in any way. Therefore we use another auxiliary set.
Let B + * be the set of all buyers who want any real item in p A . Obviously, B +x = B + * ∩ B +x . So if we can bound the size of B + * , we can use it to bound the dimension of B +x .
LEMMA 5.4. With probability 1: B A + * < 2m · k max . PROOF. The set B + * is the union of two subsets: (1) buyers who want an item above null and (2) buyers who want an item below null. Every buyer who wants an item above null in p A , must have wanted an item above null in p O , since these items were more attractive before the price increase. So the number of buyers in subset (1) is at most m · k max .
By the competitive equilibrium property, the number of buyers in subset (2) in market M A equals the number of sellers of items below null in M A . The number of sellers of items below null in the global population is at most m · k max , since the number of sellers of items that became cheaper cannot increase. Hence, the number of sellers of items below null in M A is at most m · k max , and so is the number of buyers in subset (2). All in all, B A + * < 2m · k max as claimed. B + * can be written as B + * = y =∅ B ∅≺y , since it is the set of all buyers who prefer, in p A , to buy any real item than to buy nothing. Hence, by Corollary B.16, B + * is an mdimensional random-set. Hence (see Appendix D for proof):
LEMMA 5.5. With probability at least 1 − 4/ √ 5m · k max ln 5m · k max :
PROOF. For every real item x: B +x = B + * ∩ z =x B z≺x ∩ B x * . This is an intersection of an m-dimensional bounded random-set with m one-dimensional random-sets (and another deterministic variable). Apply Lemma B.18 with d = d = m, d = 1 to conclude that the dimension of B +x is at most (m + m · 1) · ln (5m · k max ) = 2m ln (5m) + 2m ln (k max ). Assumption 5-a implies that 5m < k max , so the dimension of B +x is less than 4m ln (k max ).
Finally, consider the excess-demand subsets:
Both these sets are unions of bounded-dimension sets: the seller-sets are 1-dimensional and the buyer sets are less than 4m ln (k max )-dimensional. Hence, by Lemma B.15 each of these sets is at most 4m ln (k max )-dimensional. LEMMA 5.7. With probability at least 1 − 4/(5m 2 √ k max ln k max ):
From the global market to market
Similarly, the sets B xx are m · ln k max -dimensional, so by the same corollary (see Appendix D for proof):
LEMMA 5.8. With probability at least 1 − 4/(0.9k x ):
We want to assume, from now on, that inequality (5.1) is true and that inequalities (3.5, 5.2, 5.3,5.4) are true for all m items. We use the union bound to bound the probability of failure: . From now on, we assume that all inequalities (5.1-5.4) are true; the probability that this assumption is correct is at least 1 −
We use the Item Ordering property in order to bound the number of buyers in B A +x and B A x− for every item x. We assume that all items, including the null item, are numbered by 0, . . . , m, such that buyers move only from a higher-numbered item to a lower-numbered item. PROOF. We present the proof for items below null; the proof for items above null is its mirror image.
Part (a) follows immediately from the Item Ordering, since every buyer who abandoned an item x that became cheaper, must have discovered an item y that became cheaper even more. The set-inclusion is true for the sets in the global population, hence also for their subsets sampled to M A .
Part (b) follows from inequality (3.5), noting that S ∅x is empty since x became cheaper.
LEMMA 5.10. For every real item x:
PROOF. We present a proof for items below null; the proof for items above null is its mirror image. Note that for items below null S ∅x is empty, so in part (b) the left-hand side is only B A x− . Step I. Lemma 5.9(a) for items below null is:
Given some item-type x below null, x ∈ {0, . . . , m − 1}, take the union of both sides of the above inequality for 0, . . . , x (note that the right-hand side does not change): Step II. Lemma 5.9(b) for items below null is:
x− <2m k max ln k max Given some item-type x below null, x ∈ {0, . . . , m − 1}, take the sum of both sides of the above inequality for 0, . . . , x − 1 :
Combine this with the conclusion of Step I:
Since x ≤ m − 1, the right-hand side of both inequalities above is at most 2m 2 √ k max ln k max , as claimed.
From market A to the global market
Lemma 5.10 implies that the antecedents of inequalities (5.2,5.3) are true. Hence, the consequents are also true and:
If p A is applied to the global population, the excess demand is:
It can be either positive or negative, and by (5.5),(5.6):
−5m 2 k max ln k max < D x < 5m 2 k max ln k max
From the global market to market B
In M B , the loss of gain-from-trade comes from two sources:
-Some efficient buyers/sellers do not want to trade; this effect is represented by S x∅ and B x− . -Some inefficient traders want to trade, and compete with the efficient traders in the Buyers/Sellers Lottery; this effect is represented by S ∅x and B +x .
The first loss is at most (D +x ) + (D x− ) and these are the least efficient traders from the set of k x efficient traders. Hence, it is bounded by: 10m 2 √ k max ln k max k x . For the second loss, we have to calculate the probability that a trader loses a deal in the lottery. We consider the case of excess demand. The excess demand in 
so by Assumption 5-b:
This is the antecedent in (5.4); hence, its consequent is true:
xx ≥ 0.4k min so the probability that a buyer loses a deal in the Buyers Lottery is at most:
The case of excess supply in x is handled analogously.
In both cases, the expected loss in gain-from-trade in item x is at most 13m 2
. Finally, we have to take account of the probability of failure -the probability that one or more steps in our analysis is false. Above we bounded this probability by
which is clearly less than 13m 2
. Hence, the competitive ratio of RSDA is at least:
Removing the dependency on k min
As noted in Subsection 1.4.2, in random-sampling mechanisms it is often assumed that the gain-from-trade from each single deal is bounded between 1 and some constant h. If this assumption is true, then the competitive ratio can be made independent of k min . The key observations are: (a) for every item x, the total gain-from-trade is at most h · k x ; (b) the total gain-from-trade is at least 1 · k max .
We first have to handle Assumption 5-b. For every item x, we consider two cases:
(1) Assumption 5-b is true for x, i.e, k x ≥ 50m 2 √ k max ln k max . In this case the analysis so far is true and the absolute loss in gain-from-trade in item x is at most (13m 2
The loss in gain-fromtrade in item x is at most the total gain-from-trade in item x, which is at most h · k x < 50m 2 h · √ k max ln k max . All in all, the absolute loss in gain-from-trade is at most 50m 3 h · √ k max ln k max . But the absolute gain-from-trade is at least k max . Hence, the competitive ratio is at least:
BUYERS WITH GROSS-SUBSTITUTE VALUATIONS
In this section there are m item-types. The sellers are still single-type and sell at most m units of their type. The buyers are multi-type and have Gross-Substitute (GS) valuations. We first prove that GS valuations are similar to unit-demand valuations in that they have the Item Ordering property. This is done in Appendix C. Having proved the IO property, most of the analysis for unit-demand is applicable to GS. There are several differences which we highlight below. Most proofs are similar to the proofs of the previous section and are delegated to Appendix E.
Our bounds on the dimensions of the buyer-sets are weaker and we need stronger assumptions:
Dimensions of traders sets
The seller-sets are still one-dimensional. The buyer-sets are more complicated. We need the following auxiliary sets.
-For every bundle X including the empty bundle, let B X * = the set of buyers who want the bundle X in p O (regardless of what they want in p A ). Since p O is a deterministic price-vector, B X * is a deterministic set. There are 2 m such sets. -For every two different bundles Y and Z including the empty bundle, let B Z≺Y = the set of buyers who prefer the bundle Y to the bundle Z when the price vector is p A . All these sets are one-dimensional, since they are determined by a single random inequality
There are 2 2m such sets. Instead of Lemma 5.2, we have: LEMMA 6.1. For every real item x, the dimension of B x− is less than 2 2m ln k max .
Instead of Lemma 5.3, we have: LEMMA 6.2. For every real item x, the dimension of B xx is at most 2 2m ln k max .
Let B + * be, as before, the set of all buyers who want any non-empty bundle in p A . Lemma 5.4 and Lemma 5.5 are true as-is, i.e, so w.p. 1 − 4/ √ 5m · k max ln 5m · k max :
Instead of Lemma 5.6, we have: LEMMA 6.3. W.p. 1 − 4/ √ 5m · k max ln 5m · k max , for every real item x, the dimension of B +x is less than 2 2m ln k max .
The sets D x− , D +x are defined as before, and their dimension is at most 2 2m ln k max .
From the global market to market A
Inequality (3.5) is true as-is in the GS case. For each item x, we can treat each set of x-buyers and x-sellers in isolation from the other item-types. This implies that the inequalities for different item-types might be statistically dependent, but this need not bother us since we use the union bound to claim that the inequality is correct for all m item-types. The union bound does not depend on statistical independence.
The dimensions of the sets D x− , D +x are larger, so we have to update Lemma 5.7. The new inequalities are, w.p. 1 − 4/(5m 2 √ k max ln k max ):
The sets B xx are 2 2m · ln k max -dimensional, so we have to update the proof of Lemma 5.8; the updated proof requires the stronger assumptions presented above. Based on these stronger assumptions, Lemma 5.8 is still true:
Lemma 5.9 is true as-is for GS buyers, since its proof uses only the Item-Ordering and inequality (3.5). However, Lemma 5.10 should be changed, since the sets B A y− are not necessarily pairwise-disjoint -the same buyer may abandon more than one item (indeed, we found a specific GS valuation function on 5 items in which a buyer abandons 3 items and discovers only 2 items).
Each buyer can belong to at most m different B A y− subsets. For each buyer, create m duplicates -one for each subset B A y− . Now, the subsets are pairwise-disjoint but the bound on their size is multiplied by m, so we get the following weaker lemma: LEMMA 6.4. For every item x:
From market A to the global market
Lemma 6.4 implies that the antecedents of inequalities (6.1),(6.2) are true. Hence, the consequents are also true and:
and the excess demand in the global population in price p A is bounded by:
From the global market to market B
The last step of calculating the expected gain-from-trade is similar to the unit-demand case. We only need to plug-in the updated inequalities. We get a competitive ratio of at
when the valuations are bounded between 1 and h.
FUTURE WORK
The reader may ask why we insist that the sellers be single-type. Indeed, we could have swapped the roles of buyers and sellers and prove analogous results for single-type buyers and multi-type sellers. However, when both buyers and sellers are multi-type, the RSDA mechanism as currently written is not truthful for the seller. Suppose that Sally is a seller who gains 10 from selling x and 9 from selling y. If she thinks that the excess supply in item x is going to be larger, it may be better for her to act strategically and claim that she prefers to sell y, in order to increase her chances of keeping the money in the Seller Lottery. We currently do not know how to handle this problem.
Another line of future work is to extend the mechanism to valuations that are not grosssubstitute. This poses two challenges: (a) a Walrasian equilibrium might not exist, (b) the Item Ordering property might not hold. We do not know how to overcome challenge (a). However, given that a Walrasian equilibrium does exist and that there are at most three item types, we can prove that the RSDA mechanism attains good competitive ratio for arbitrary valuations. We plan to check whether this is also true for four or more item types.
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APPENDIX
A. NEGATIVE RESULTS
This appendix contains some examples that illustrate the limitations of ours and other mechanisms.
A.1. It is not enough to know the prices
We present here a negative result in which the prices are determined exogenously, like in the RSDA mechanism, in which the prices in each market are determined exogenously by the equilibrium in the other market.
When there is only one item-type and the prices are exogenous, the simple revelation mechanism is trivially truthful, since for each trader there are only two options: either buy/sell the item or not. Hence, it is always in the best interests of the traders to reveal their true valuations. This is not the case when there are two item types. We show that, even if prices are set exogenously and the market-size of the two items is the same and arbitrarily large, it is still impossible to have an incentive-compatible individually-rational mechanism in which the market-gain-from-trade converges to its maximum.
A.1.1. The traders. Given some large integer k, let ε be a positive constant such that ε 1/k, and p an exogenously-determined price-vector with p x ≥ 1, p y ≥ 1. In our example there are n = 2k buyers, all of whom are unit-demand, prefer to buy x but gain also from buying y. We define two buyer-sets:
-B 1 , with b i,x − p x = ε and b i,y − p y = ε 2 (they gain ε from buying x and ε 2 from buying y). -B 2 , with b i,x − p x = 2 and b i,y − p y = 2 ; There are n = 2k sellers, all of whom are additive, prefer to sell y but gain also from selling x. We define two seller-sets:
-S 1 , with p y − s i,y = and p x − s i,x = 2 (they gain ε from selling y and ε 2 from selling x).
-S 2 , with p y − s i,y = 2 and p x − s i,x = 2 .
A.1.2. The optimal situation. In the optimal exchange, every buyer buys a single item, so 2k items exchange hands. All buyers in B 2 buy x and gain 2ε; all sellers in S 2 sell y and gain 2ε. Additionally, to balance supply and demand we must have the B 1 buyers buy y and some k sellers (whether from S 1 or S 2 ) sell x. The market-size in the same for both items. i.e: k x = k y = k min = k max = k. The optimal gain-from-trade, as a function of the market-size, is:
We now analyze the gain-from-trade attainable an arbitrary randomized truthful mechanism. Before doing so, we must carefully define a mechanism. Generally, a mechanism is a function that accepts the reported valuation functions of buyers and sellers, and returns a probability distribution on balanced exchanges. Below we define these terms formally.
An exchange is a function that maps each agent (buyer or seller) to a bundle of items. An exchange e says that seller i should sell the items e(s i ) for their price p e(s i ) and buyer i should buy the items e(b i ) for their price p e(b i ) . An exchange is x-balanced if the number of sellers for whom x ∈ e(s i ) equals the number of buyers for whom x ∈ e(b i ). An exchange is balanced if it is both x-balanced and y-balanced. Let E denote the set of balanced exchanges.
The gain-from-trade of an exchange is the value the buyers gain from the items they get, minus the value the sellers lose from the items they give (the money is not counted because all money moves between buyers and sellers):
The optimal gain-from-trade is the gain-from-trade when the optimal balanced-exchange is done:
A.1.4. Mechanisms. A mechanism is a function r that receives as input the reported valuations of all agents, b = (b 1 , . . . , b n ), s = (s 1 , . . . , s n ). These reports may be different than the true valuations b = (b 1 , . . . , b n ), s = (s 1 , . . . , s n ). The output of the mechanism, r(b , s ), is a vector of probabilities on E (the set of balanced exchanges). The probability of carrying out exchange e is denoted by r(b , s ; e), with ∑ e∈E r(b , s ; e) = 1.
For every buyer i and bundle X, the probability that the mechanism tells i to buy X is:
Similarly, the probability that the mechanism tells seller i to sell X is:
and the expected gain-from-trade is:
The competitive ratio of a truthful mechanism is defined as a function of k -the optimal number of deals in x and y (we consider here only scenarios in which k x = k y = k):
where the infimum is on all valuation vectors b, s such that, in the optimal exchange, k units of x and k units of y exchange hands.
A.1.5. Analysis. We are interested in the success probability of each trader -the probability that a buyer/seller manages to buy/sell the preferred item x/y, respectively.
Since buyers are unit-demand, the success probability for buyer i is:
Since sellers are additive, the success probability for seller i is:
LEMMA A.1. Let r be an individually-rational incentive-compatible mechanism with competitive ratio function α(k). Then, when the traders are as in Subsection A.1.1:
(all agents buy/sell their favorite item with probability at least α(k)).
PROOF. Consider the alternative valuation b which is identical to b except that buyer i's valuation is such that b i,x − p x = V 1 (instead of ). In this valuation, almost all gainfrom-trade comes from buyer i buying x, since by assumption V kε. The optimal gainfrom-trade is ≈ V and the mechanism's expected gain-from-trade is ≈ r x (b , s; b i ) · V, since the gain from all other other deals is negligible. Hence, we must have r x (b , s; b 
If the true valuation of buyer i is b i but he deviates and reports b i , his expected gain is at least r x (b , s; b i ) · ≥ α(k) · . Hence, in order to be incentive-compatible, the mechanism must guarantee that buyer i receives at least the same expected gain by reporting truthfully b i . Almost all the gain of buyer b i comes from buying item 1, so the mechanism must ensure that
COROLLARY A.2. The competitive ratio of any individually-rational incentive-compatible mechanism is at most 1/2 regardless of the number of efficient deals. I.e, for every k, α(k) ≤ 1/2. PROOF. By Lemma A.1, the probability that a buyer buys x is at least α(k), so the expected number of x-units exchanging hands is at least 2k · α(k). The same is true for item y. All in all, the expected number of items traded is at least 4k · α(k). But since the buyers are unit demand, the total number of units traded is at most 2k, the number of buyers. So 4k · α(k) ≤ 2k and α(k) ≤ 1/2.
A.2. McAfee's mechanism might have near zero market-gain-from-trade
McAfee's mechanism is weakly-budget-balanced but not strongly-budget-balanced. The following example shows that, while the total-gain-from-trade (gain-from-trade including money left on the table) of is 1 − 1/k of the optimum, the market-gain-from-trade (gainfrom-trade of the buyers and sellers) might be near zero.
Consider the following single-type single-unit market. There are k buyers and k sellers. For all i = 1, ..., k − 1, s i = 0 and b i = 1, and s k = and b k = 1 − , where is a positive constant which is sufficiently small such that b k s k . Because all buyers are more expensive than all sellers, the number of efficient deals is exactly k.
The optimal market-gain-from-trade occurs when all sellers sell and all buyers buy, and it is: k − 2 . McAfee's mechanism sets the buy price at 1 − and the sell price at . The trade includes k − 1 buyers and k − 1 sellers, each of whom has a net gain of . Hence the market-gain-from-trade is: 2(k − 1) . The auctioneer's revenue is (k − 1)(1 − 2 ), so the total-gain-from-trade is (k − 1). When → 0, the total-gain-from-trade remains nearly optimal but the market-gain-from-trade becomes arbitrarily small: most of the gain-fromtrade is grabbed by the auctioneer.
A.3. Naive generalizations of McAfee's mechanism to multi-unit do not work
In this section we show that a naive application of McAfee's mechanism to virtual-agents (VAs) is usually not incentive-compatible.
Consider a single-type multi-unit market, and assume McAfee's mechanism is applied to VAs. Suppose that a certain RA has one of its VAs as seller k and another VA as seller l < k. This RA has an incentive to report a higher value for s k in order to increase the sell price. This does not affect the virtual seller k because it is removed from the trade, but it does affect the virtual seller l, thus increasing the revenue of this RA.
A solution that comes to mind is to remove from trade, not only the VA setting the price, but also all the other VAs of the same RA. But this might incentivize the agents to report untruthfully in order not to become the price-setters.
Another solution that comes to mind is to run McAfee's mechanism m times, each time with a single unit per trader. But then, a buyer who thinks that the price in the second A:29 session will be lower, might have an incentive to report a low price in the first session, in order to not buy anything, then buy his first unit in a bargain price in the second session.
While we cannot claim that it is impossible to generalize McAfee's mechanism to the multi-unit case, we can claim that we (and others) have made substantial efforts in this direction but have not managed to achieve incentive-compatibility. This failure motivated us to use the random-sampling technique. An interesting question is whether there exists a multi-unit variant of McAfee that does not require random-sampling (and hence attains a better asymptotic competitive ratio).
A.4. RSDA mechanism performs poorly when market-sizes of different items are too different Our approximation is meaningful only if k min and k max are not too far away. In particular, we need to assume that:
The following example shows that this requirement is real -it is not only an artifact of our analysis. The example shows that, even when both k max and k min are very large, there is a constant probability of losing most of the gain-from-trade, so the approximation ratio does not converge to 1. There are five sets of traders in the market. Their sizes and valuations are presented in the following table, where k and K are parameters and K ≥ k.
The columns # M O , # M A and # M B show the number of traders of each set in the global population and in the two half-markets, respectively. Note that the sampling deviation in each set is well within the probable limits since:
-Most sets are sampled exactly half-by-half, which is the ideal situation for any sampling mechanism. -The two members of S xx fall in M A ; this can happen with probability 1/4. -In S yy , the sampling deviation is at least S yy ; this can happen with constant probability.
In all cases, the probability of deviation is independent of k, while the number of efficient deals in both item-types is increasing with k, which can be arbitrarily large.
In the global market, the optimal prices are 6 ≤ p O x ≤ p O y ≤ 9. These prices ensure that all sellers are willing to sell, all buyers are willing to buy, and the supply of x and y is divided between the buyers according to their demand (so the B xy buyers buy x from the S x∅ sellers).
In M A , there is a deviation in the number of S yy sellers. This deviation is small relative to their total number, but large relative to the number of x buyers. To balance the excess supply, the price of y goes down until the B xy buyers start buying y and the S yy sellers are indifferent between selling and not selling. Moreover, the two B xx sellers happen to fall in the other market. Hence, there is no demand at all for x, so in equlibrium the price of x goes down until the S x∅ sellers are out of the market. If we assume that the mechanism takes the minimal Walrasian price, this price will be 1, so that the B xy buyers agree to buy y.
In M B , the price of x is too low so the S x∅ sellers do not sell. The supply of x is 0 and the two important B xx buyers cannot buy. Almost all welfare is lost. This is summarized in the 
Note that this disaster cannot happen with one item-type, even when almost all welfare comes from a single buyer. The reason is that, as long as k (the number of efficient deals) is sufficiently large, there will be sufficiently many sellers willing to sell the item in a price that the important buyer is willing to pay.
A:31
B. HALVING LEMMAS
In this section we prove some general lemmas about sizes of subsets of agents when a population is divided randomly to two halves. The following notation is used:
-Z -a subset of agents in the general population.
-Z A /Z B -the subset of Z that was sampled into the half-market M A /M B .
-The shorthand "w.p. x" means "with probability of at least x".
-The shorthand
When the name of a subset appears in a numeric context, it denotes the number of elements in that subset. I.e, we sometimes write "Z" instead of "|Z|".
B.1. Deterministic-set Halving Lemma
LEMMA B.1 (DETERMINISTIC-SET HALVING LEMMA). If Z is a deterministic set of virtual agents, where every real agent represents at most m virtual agents, then for every constant r ≥ 1:
PROOF. For every real-agent that represents v ≤ m virtual-agents in Z, define a random variable that equals v if the agent is in M A and 0 otherwise. These are i.i.d. random variables each of which is bounded in [0, m] . The sum of these variables is |Z A | and the expectation of the sum is |Z/2|. For every parameter t, define the failure probability as:
By Hoeffding's inequality:
If the set Z is not deterministic but depends on the outcomes of the random sampling, then Lemma B.1 is not true without further restrictions. As an extreme example, suppose Z is defined as the set of all agents that were sampled to M A . Then, obviously Z A = Z and it is not true that |Z A − Z/2| is small. To handle such cases in a meaningful way we need to use some structure on the possible values of the set Z.
B.2. d-bounded random-sets
Throughout this and the following sections, all the sets we consider are finite. Our goal is to use the lemmas for sets of agents.
Motivated by the Random-set Halving Lemma, we now present ways to construct dbounded random-sets.
B.3. d-dimensional random-sets
Definition B.7. Let W be a set-family and w an arbitrary set. Define the following setfamilies:
W ∩ w := {w ∩ w |w ∈ W} W \ w := {w \ w |w ∈ W} Definition B.8. Given an integer d ≥ 1, a set-family W is called d-dimensional if for every set w , the family W ∩ w is d-bounded (Definition B.4).
Note: An equivalent condition is that for every set w , the family W \ w is d-bounded (apply the original definition with w = w = the complement of w ).
The following definition is borrowed from measure theory and stochastic processes theory. Definition B.10. A set-family {w 1 , w 2 , . . . } is called a filtration if for all i < j: w i ⊂ w j .
LEMMA B.11. Every filtration is a 1-dimensional set-family.
PROOF. Let W be a filtration. For every set w , W ∩ w is clearly also a filtration. In every filtration, ∀i, j : i < j: w i ⊂ w j , and all sets are finite, so there can be at most a single w i with any given cardinality. Hence, for every w , the family W ∩ w is 1-bounded. Hence, W is 1-dimensional.
Example B.12. A typical example of a filtration is the family {w 1 , w 2 , . . . } where for every j, w j is the set of j sellers with the lowest sale price for a certain item. This implies that the random-set of Example B.5, the set of sellers who want to sell an item when its price is at least a random variable p, is a 1-dimensional random-set.
B.4. Intersections and unions of d-dimensional random-sets
LEMMA B.13. If W is a d-dimensional set-family and w is any set, then the set-family W ∩ w is also d-dimensional.
PROOF. We have to prove that for any set w , the set-
COROLLARY B.14. The intersection of a d-dimensional random-set with a deterministic set yields a d-dimensional random-set.
LEMMA B.15. If Z 1 is a d 1 -dimensional random-set and Z 2 is a d 2 -dimensional random-set, then their union:
PROOF. Let W i be the support of Z i (for i = 1, 2) and W the support of Z. Let w by any deterministic set. We have to prove that W ∩ w is a (d 1 + d 2 )-bounded set-family.
We know that for both i, W i is d i -dimensional. By Lemma B.13, W i ∩ w is d i -dimensional. Suppose we want to construct a set in the family W ∩ w , and we want it to have cardinality j. The choices we can make are as follows:
A:34 -First, we choose a set w 1 from the family W 1 ∩ w . The size of w 1 must be between 0 and j, so we have at most (j + 1) choices for the size of w 1 and then at most (j + 1) d 1 −1 for the set w 1 itself (because W 1 ∩ w is d 1 -dimensional). -Next, we choose a set w 2 from the family (W 2 ∩ w ) \ w 1 . The size of w 2 must be exactly j − |w 1 |. Since the family (W 2 ∩ w ) \ w 1 is d 2 -dimensional, we have at most (j + 1) d 2 −1 choices for w 2 .
All in all, the number of choices is at most (j + 1) · (j + 1)
Since this is true for every set w , the set-family
COROLLARY B.16. For every d, the union of d one-dimensional random-sets is a ddimensional random-set.
PROOF. By induction on d, using Lemma B.15 as the induction step.
Example B.17. A typical example of a 2-dimensional random-set is: the set of buyers who value item x as at least p x OR value item y as at least p y , where p x and p y are numeric random variables.
The analogue of the above lemma for intersections of random-sets is not true. Intersections of random-sets have a bounded dimension only if one of the elements in the intersection has a bounded cardinality.
Then their intersection Z, defined as:
PROOF. Let W k,d be the support of Z k,d ; for each i ∈ 1, . . . , d let W i be the support of Z i ; let W be the support of Z. Let w by any deterministic set. We have to prove that W ∩ w is
Every set w ∈ W ∩ w can be constructed in the following way:
Since there are at most k choices for j 0 , the total number of choices for w 0 is at most k d . For every i ≥ 1, j i ≤ j i−1 and the final set w is equal to w d . Hence, the number of elements in w is j d . So we have to select a weakly-decreasing sequence of non-negative integers, j 1 , . . . ,
For each j i there are at most k − j < k choices, so the total number of sequences is at most k d −1 .
The set-families used in each of the following steps are intersections of a d -dimensional set with deterministic sets. Hence they are all d -dimensional. For every selection of j i , there are at most (j i + 1) d −1 ≤ k d −1 choices for w i . The total number of choices for all the w i , for i = 1, . . . , d , is thus at most k d ·(d −1) .
Multiplying the three numbers of choices gives that the total number of ways to construct w is at most
Remark B.19. If the set Z k,d is deterministic and Z k,d = k w.p. 1, then the set W k,d is a singleton and there is only one way to choose w 0 . Since 1 = k 0 , the proof is still valid if we take d = 0, so the resulting random-set is (d · d · ln k)-dimensional (effectively, we treat a deterministic set-variable as a "zero-dimensional" random-set).
B.5. Generalized Random-set Halving Corollaries
Since we will use the Generalized Random-set Halving Lemma a lot, we present it below in several more convenient forms.
Let Z be a d-dimensional random-set. Then for every constant z min , the following is true w.p. 1 − 4/z min : Definition C.1. A utility function u is M # -concave if-and-only-if, for every two bundles X, Y and for every X ⊆ X \ Y with |X | = 1 (i.e, X' is a singleton), there exists a subset Y ⊆ Y \ X with |Y | ≤ 1 (i.e, Y' is either empty or a singleton) such that: 
Hence, the M # -concave condition is independent of price:
Definition C.4. Given a utility function u and a constant bundle Z, define the marginal utility function u Z+ as a utility function on bundles that have an empty intersection with Z, i.e:
LEMMA C.5. A utility function u is M # -concave if-and-only-if, for every bundle Z, the marginal-utility function u Z+ is M # -concave.
PROOF. The "if" direction is obvious since ∅ is also a bundle and u ∅+ ≡ u. For the "only if" direction, suppose u is M # -concave and let Z be an arbitrary bundle. We have to prove that u Z+ is M # -concave, i.e, for all bundles X, Y with X ∩ Z = Y ∩ Z = ∅, and for every X ⊆ X \ Y with |X | = 1, there exists a Y ⊆ Y \ X with |Y | ≤ 1 such that:
Since u is M # -concave, we can apply the definition of M # -concave to the bundles Z ∪ X and Z ∪ Y. Indeed, since X ∩ Z = X ∩ Z = Y ∩ Z = ∅:
since it does not matter whether we first add X to Z and then remove some items from the union, or first remove these items from X and then add the remaining items to Z. Similarly, since also Y ∩ Z = ∅:
2) and (C.1) are equivalent.
C.2. Maximizing bundles
Definition C.6. Given a valuation function u on m items and a number i ∈ {0, . . . , m}, a bundle Z i is called i-maximizer of u if it maximizes u among all bundles with i items. I.e, |Z i | = i and for every other bundle X i with i items, u(Z i ) ≥ u(X i ). PROOF. The lemma is obviously true when i = 0 since there is a unique 0-maximizer (the empty set). It is also true when j = m since there is a unique m-maximizer (the set containing all items). We have to prove it for 1 ≤ i < j ≤ m − 1, which is possible only when m ≥ 3. The proof is by induction on m.
Base: m = 3, j = 2, i = 1. Let Z 1 be a 1-maximizer and Z 2 a 2-maximizer. If Z 1 ⊆ Z 2 then we are done. Otherwise, Z 1 contains a single item, e.g. {x}, and Z 2 contains the other two items, {y, z}. Apply the M # -concave definition with X = Z 2 and Y = Z 1 and X = {y}. Then, Y can be either ∅ or {x}:
-If Y = ∅, then by the M # -concave condition: u({z}) + u({x, y}) ≥ u({x}) + u({y, z}).
Then {z} must be a 1-maximizer and {x, y} must be a 2-maximizer; the former is contained in Z 2 and the latter contains Z 1 so we are done. -If Y = {x}, then by the M # -concave condition: u({x, z}) + u({y}) ≥ u({x}) + u({y, z}).
Then {y} must be a 1-maximizer and {x, z} must be a 2-maximizer; the former is contained in Z 2 and the latter contains Z 1 so we are done.
Step: we assume that the lemma is true when there are less than m items and prove that it is true for m items, where m ≥ 4. Let Z i be an i-maximizer and Z j a j-maximizer. We consider several cases.
Case 1: There is an item which is not in Z i nor in Z j . W.l.o.g. call it item 1. Let u be the restriction of u to the items {2, . . . , m}. Then Z i is an i-maximizer of u and Z j is a jmaximizer of u . By the induction assumption, the lemma is true for u . Hence, there is a j-maximizer of u , say Z j , which contains Z i . Since both Z j and Z j are j-maximizers of u , u (Z j ) = u (Z j ). Hence u(Z j ) = u(Z j ). Hence, Z j is also a j-maximizer of u, so part (a) is done. Similarly, there is an i-maximizer of u , say Z i , which is contained in Z j . Since both Z i and Z i are i-maximizers of u , u (Z i ) = u (Z i ). Hence u(Z i ) = u(Z i ). Hence, Z i is also an i-maximizer of u, so part (b) is done.
Case 2: There is an item which is in both Z i and Z j . W.l.o.g. call it item 1. Let u be the marginal utility function u {1}+ . By Lemma C.5, u also is M # -concave. It is a valuation function on m − 1 items, {2, . . . , m}. The bundle Z i−1 = Z i \ {1} is an (i − 1)-maximizer of u and the bundle Z j−1 = Z j \ {1} is a (j − 1)-maximizer of u . By the Let P be a p-demand and Q a p -demand. We consider two cases. Case 1: |Q| ≤ |P|. For every bundle Y, u p (Y) = u p (Y) + d · |Y|. Since d ≥ 0, in the move from p to p , smaller sets became (relatively) less attractive while larger sets became relatively more attractive. Hence, if |Q| ≤ |P| and Q is a p -demand, then P is necessarily a p -demand too. P ⊇ P so we are done.
Case 2: |Q| > |P|. Let i = |P| and j = |Q|. Then, P is an i-maximizer of the net-utility function u p and Q is a j-maximizer of the net-utility function u p . But, the change in price between p and p does not affect the preference relation between bundles of the same size. Hence, P is also an i-maximizer of u p . Since j > i, by Lemma C.7/a there exists a j-maximizer of u p that contains P. Call it P . By definition of a j-maximizer, u p (P ) ≥ u p (Q). Hence, P is also a p -demand. P ⊇ P so we are done.
The Uniform Price Change lemma is not true when there are complementary items.
Example C.10. There are three items: a desktop computer, a desktop monitor and a laptop. The buyer needs a single computer system. His valuation for the desktop system (computer+monitor together) is 500 but his valuation for each desktop item alone is 0. His valuation for the laptop alone is 400. The valuation for all three items is 500 since the agent needs only one system. If the prices of all items are very low (e.g. 1 per item), then the agent prefers the desktop monitor+computer. But if the prices of all items increase to 200, then the net utility from the laptop is 200 while the net utility from the desktop system is 100, so the agent discovers the laptop, in contrast to part b of the lemma.
It is easy to check that this valuation function also does not satisfy the Item Ordering property.
C.4. Item Ordering property
LEMMA C.11. If a utility function is M # -concave, then it has the IO property.
PROOF. Let p, q be two price-vectors and ∆ x = q x − p x . We now prove part (a) in the IO definition. The proof of part (b) is its mirror-image.
Consider an item x with ∆ x ≤ 0 that is p-demanded but not q-demanded. Define the price-vector p as (see Figure 3) : ∀y : p y = p y + ∆ x By Lemma C.9(a), all items that are p-demanded, including item x, are also p -demanded.
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Define the price-vector q as (see Figure 1) :
q y = p y = p y + ∆ x ∆ y ≥ ∆ x : q y = p y + (∆ y − ∆ x ) = p y + ∆ y = q y Between p and q , the prices of items above x weakly increased while the prices of item x and the items below x remained the same. By the GS property, item x is q -demanded, and all items below x that were p-demanded are q -demanded. The last step of the proof -the move from q to q -is true for arbitrary valuations (not only GS). Since x was q -demanded, there was a q -demand Q that contained x. Since x is not q-demanded, Q is not a q-demand. This means that there must be a different q-demand, say Q, that became more attractive than Q , i.e, u q (Q) > u q (Q ). But u q (Q) ≤ u q (Q ), so necessarily the bundle Q became cheaper more than Q . Since the only items that became cheaper are items with ∆ y < ∆ x , the bundle Q must contain one of these items y which was not previously demanded. This implies that our agent, who abandoned x, have discovered y. 
